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Abstract:
Human errors cause the majority of aviation accidents. Augmented cognition and automation systems
enhance pilot performance by evaluating system limitations and flight precision and performance. This
study examines the human-machine interface in cockpit design using the tenets of augmented cognition
and automation systems theory in terms of task allocation, attentional resources, and situational
awareness. The study compares how these principles apply to and interact with each other and with a
human/pilot in a closed-loop system. We present a method for integrating augmented cognition systems
into airplane flight management systems. We demonstrate systems enhancement with an experiment in
which test pilots flew two simulated flights, once without and once with an augmented cognition system.
We measured pilot and airplane performance, pilots’ situational awareness, workload management, pilots’
use of cockpit checklists, and flight precision along four axes: (1) altitude, (2) course, (3) radial/bearing
and heading, and (4) airspeed.
Keywords: Augmented Cognition, Automation in Aviation, Aviation Accidents, Aviation Safety, Avionic

Technology, Cockpit Design, Human Factors in Aviation, Human-Machine Integration, Pilot Error,
Situational Awareness, Systems Engineering, Work Prioritization, Workload Saturation.
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1

Reducing Human/Pilot Errors in Aviation

Introduction

Approximately 80 percent of all aviation accidents are related to human—primarily pilot—errors, and the
majority of these accidents occur during landing (24.1 percent) and takeoff (23.4 percent) (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2014; Federal Aviation Administration, 2012). Advancements in aviation
technology have led to the development of complex cockpit systems that have highly interrelated
components. Although this advancement has significantly increased efficiency and resulted in the
development and operation of enhanced systems such as cockpit automation, it has also meant greater
work overload and posed the danger of system-induced catastrophes. Numerous studies show that, to
some degree, cockpit automation poses the danger of disengaging the pilot from the cockpit. With
technological advances in avionics, automation, and computing processes, the trend seems to be
disengaging pilots from their work (Casner & Schooler, 2014; Norman & Orlady, 1988; Casner, 2009).
This trend influences pilots’ situational awareness and their aeronautical decision making (ADM).
Therefore, we need to understand how humans make decisions and how pilots can improve their ADM
skills. This study demonstrates that this can be accomplished through using an augmented cognition
system (ACS) in the cockpit by improving the human-machine interface through the human-in-the-loop
concept. An understanding of augmented cognition systems illustrates how workload and task
prioritization can influence decision making and how those factors can be modified to enhance safety in
the flight deck. It also keeps the pilot engaged with flight systems in all phases of the flight.
So far, many studies concerning automation have been performed. Casner and Schooler (2014)
demonstrate that using more automation allows pilots to engage in fewer tasks-at-hand and focus more
on higher-level tasks. At the same time, when more automation is used, measures of pilot awareness
show that less, not more, higher-level flight-related thinking has occurred. Norman and Orlady (1988)
argue that cockpit automation allows pilots to devote more time to monitor the health of the airplane, plan
around potential weather hazards, respond to air traffic controller, and plan for alternatives should
anything go wrong. But Canser and Schooler (2014) question how pilots make use of this free time.
Several studies including the one by Canser (2009) have confirmed that, at least during some phases of
flight, automation can certainly help lower pilot workload and free up time. But, contradictory to these
hopes, other work shows that pilots flying under high levels of automation are not using their free time to
monitor the health of the airplane, plan around potential weather hazards, or plan for alternatives if
something goes wrong. Endsley and Kiris (1995) show in several experiments that, when pilot awareness
was assessed, pilots could not answer basic questions about their situation. Canser (2005), by showing
that pilots did not know where they were, reaches the same conclusion.
Roscoe (1992) claims that increases in cockpit automation have resulted in changing the pilot’s role to
more of a manager or supervisor than an active controller of an airplane. Sarter, Woods, & Billings (1997)
indicate that pilots pointed out situations in which they became worried about their behavior due to cockpit
automation, which affected their focus and diverted their attention from other tasks on hand.
Numerous studies have suggested ideas to overcome the challenges with cockpit automation. Sumwalt
(2003) proposes designing precise procedures for pilots to actively monitor automated cockpit systems,
and Casner & Schooler (2014) propose developing automated systems that can “check-in” pilots by
challenging them with tasks that can bring the pilots back in the loop. A follow up study by Canser (2006)
shows that even routine talk among pilots about their position and heading was enough to counteract the
“out-of-the-loop” effects caused by using advanced cockpit automation systems. One thing missing in the
studies is the integration of augmented cognition systems with the automation systems in aircraft cockpits.
In our study, we test the efficacy of such systems.

2
2.1

Literature Review
Aviation Accidents Analysis

We collected data on aviation accidents from databases maintained by the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB), the Aviation Safety Network (ASN), and PlaneCrashInfo.com to identify common pilot
errors that led to aviation accidents.
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NTSB Aviation Accident Reports

The NTSB’s aviation accident database (National Transportation Safety Board, 2014) contains information
on civil aviation accidents and selected incidents in the United States, its territories and possessions, and
international waters dating to 1962. As of June 2014, the database included more than 72,000 accident
and incident reports. The NTSB determines the probable causes of each accident and issues safety
recommendations aimed at preventing similar accidents.
The database is organized by event (i.e., an accident or incident) and includes tables, one of which
contains a narrative field that identifies the probable cause of each accident or incident and presents a
many-to-one relationship with other tables. Using IBM’s Many Eyes visualization technology word tree
(IBM Co., 2014), we analyzed the probable causes as identified in the narrative fields.
A word tree is a visual search tool for unstructured text, such as a book, article, or speech (IBM Co.,
2014). It allows the user to choose a word or phrase and retrieves all the occurrences of the word or
phrase, along with the phrase that follows it. Context is arranged in a branching format to reveal recurrent
themes and phrases.
Figure 1 shows a word tree created from the narratives table of the NTSB’s database for the period
January 2000 to June 2014 by using the search term “pilot’s”. Font size represents how often the word or
phrase is used. Here, the word “pilot’s” occurs frequently, accompanied by phrase "failure", which also
occurs frequently (International Business Machines Corporation, 2014). For instance, “failure” follows
“pilot’s” many times, as do “inadequate” and “improper.”

Figure 1. IBM Word Tree

Going a step further, a fishbone diagram in Figure 2 shows the main causes of aviation accidents. Red
indicates the types of errors by pilots that caused the majority of aviation accidents. As Figure 2 shows,
some of the main pilot errors are misjudgments, delayed decisions, failure to follow the procedures, failure
to maintain aircraft control, and failure to maintain proper airspeed.
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Figure 2. Fishbone Diagram Shows Causes of Aviation Accident from January 2000 to June 2014

2.1.2

Aviation Safety Network (ASN) Reports

The ASN Safety Database (Aviation Safety Network, 2015), which is updated every week, contains
information on more than 15,800 commercial, military transport, and private aircraft safety occurrences
since 1921. For the purposes of this study, we considered accidents involving aircraft capable of carrying
at least 12 passengers for the period from January 2000 to June 2014.
Figure 3 presents the number of hull-loss accidents and fatalities per year for each flight phase for
commercial, corporate, and military transport aircraft.
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Figure 3. Aviation Accidents by Flight Phases

2.1.3

PlaneCrashInfo.com Reports

This database includes all civil and commercial aircraft accidents of scheduled and nonscheduled
passenger airliners worldwide that resulted in a fatality (including all U.S. Part 121 and Part 135 fatal
accidents) (Plane Crash Info Database, 2014). Figure 4 includes data from 1950 to June 2014 for
1,085 fatal accidents worldwide involving commercial aircraft for which a specific cause is known. It does
not include aircraft with 18 or fewer people aboard, military aircraft, private aircraft, or helicopters (Plane
Crash Info Database, 2014).

Figure 4. Causes of Fatal Accidents

2.2

Current research in Aviation Safety and Augmented Cognition Systems

Several U.S. Government agencies, such as the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), have used augmented cognition (AugCog) applications in flight
contexts to enhance pilot perception through synthetic vision technology (Prinzel et al., 2014) and
increased situation awareness (Foyle, Andre, & Hooey, 2005). NASA has also investigated AugCog’s
ability to reduce workload and manage data overload. Interest is growing in the private sector as well.
Systems architecture and follow-on techniques that detect and analyze a subject’s workload have been
used in commercial notification and communication systems.
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Improvements in human cognition are particularly valuable when human mistakes can cause serious
accidents, as with aircraft pilots. For instance, pilot errors may be linked to the pilot’s inappropriate
allocation of attention resources. Research on attention allocation has shown that, when a human
operator is faced with several decisions that require similar processing resources, there are typically
tradeoffs in making these decisions (Adams, 2005).
Advancements in information technology have led to the development of complex systems that have
highly interrelated components. Although this advancement has significantly increased efficiency and
resulted in the development and operation of enhanced systems, it has also meant greater work overload
and posed the danger of system-induced catastrophes. Perrow (1984) argues that highly coupled complex
systems with highly interdependent components are inherently unstable and disposed to massive failure.
This potential instability has made human factors-based evaluation even more important than previously.
To avoid common human errors, today’s aviation training covers many of the lessons learned from human
factors research on aviation accidents. For example, threat and error management (TEM) is emphasized.
TEM recognizes that, even when flights are planned and operated by trained pilots in collaboration with
dispatchers, mechanics, flight attendants, and others, human beings still make mistakes, especially when
the environment presents challenges. TEM trains pilots to recognize errors as quickly as possible and
manage or mitigate their negative impact (Federal Aviation Administration, 2012).

2.3

The Cognitive Cockpit

In the late 1990s, the British Ministry of Defense group QinetiQ created the cognitive cockpit, or “CogPit”
(Adams, 2005). CogPit is a test bed for researching and documenting automated decision support and
AugCog systems in single-seat aircraft. QinetiQ’s vision is to create and implement a “trustworthy
automation” that can be sensitive to context (Adams, 2005). Pilot data and aircraft sensors are used to
create a series of tasks that can either be automatically executed or directed to the pilot through display
messages. The current CogPit simulator includes software that analyzes the pilot’s workload through such
measures as electroencephalography (EEG) and control inputs (Adams, 2005; Foyle et al., 2005; Prinzel
et al., 2014). In the planning process, the pilot chooses from six automation levels, ranging from fully
manual to fully automatic. Risk mitigation includes master-arm switch automation, defensive-aids-suite
activation, and targeting-pod execution (Adams, 2005).
QinetiQ tested the CogPit system using six pilots in six multisegment air-to-ground missions. As cognitive
loads increased, automation levels increased. Results suggest that cognitive augmentation improves
survivability (Adams, 2005). However, additional trials are needed to assess the efficacy of cognitive
augmentation.
The US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) human-systems integration lab partnered with BMH
Associates, Inc. (now Alion Science and Technology) to conduct similar research and has now tested
eight pilots during a simulated close-air-support mission (Adams, 2005). Pilots were connected to
electroencephalography (EEG), electrocardiogram (EKG), and electrooculography (EOG) sensors and
simulated a 10-minute flight over a target area with the mission to identify and destroy up to four enemy
tanks while avoiding surface-to-air missiles (Adams, 2005). Pilot-approved mitigations for the mission
included automated chaff release and slewing to the target. Afterward, each pilot flew four similar missions
without decision support and four with decision support using randomly deployed mitigations. The study’s
goal was to demonstrate at least a 50 percent improvement in targeting and 50 percent decrease in
friendly fire compared to baseline data (Adams, 2005). As of this writing, final results have not been
released, but preliminary results show a 200 percent increase in targeting and no incidents of friendly fire
(Adams, 2005).
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) also has used augmented cognition to
develop innovative technologies that will transform human-machine interaction by making information
systems sensitive to the capabilities and limitations of the human component of the system. By measuring
individual human capabilities while being sensitive to human limitations, the DARPA study demonstrated
that an augmented cognition system can improve overall system performance by an order of magnitude
(St. John, Kobus, Morrison, & Schmorrow, 2004). Many advances in the field of cognitive science and
understanding of human decision making have recently been made (St. John et al., 2004). Advancements
in sensor technologies for measuring brain activity and various facets of cognition have facilitated how
information is presented to the human operators of complex systems. Despite all the progress with sensor
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technologies, uncertainty remains about the accuracy of the information collected by cognitive sensors
and their interconnectivity and practicality.

2.4

Common Areas in Current ACS Research

In general, AugCog uses methods and designs that combine computation and knowledge about human
limitations to address biases and shortfalls in human cognition. It does this by continuously assessing the
user’s context (e.g., in the case of a pilot, attention, workload, and stress) and learning to recognize the
trends, patterns, and situations relevant to the user’s context and goals. An AugCog system must include
at least four components:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Sensors for determining the user state
An inference engine or classifier to evaluate incoming sensor information
An adaptive user interface, and
An underlying computational system architecture to integrate these components (Schmorrow &
Kruse, 2004).

An entirely functioning system would have several more components, but the four listed above are the
most important for inclusion in an augmented cognition system. Separately, each of these components is
straightforward. Much of the current augmented cognition research seeks to close the loop by
incorporating these components and build computational systems that adapt to the user. Although
researchers are using more complex sensors, the challenge with these systems is not the sensing
component. Rather, it is precisely predicting and assessing information from the sensors—namely,
identifying the user’s state and choosing a suitable strategy to aid the user at that point.
For an ACS to work well, it should recognize at least one of these sensing shortfalls in real time and
improve it in the course of a performance-improving alleviation strategy. These alleviation strategies are
presented to the user in the course of the adaptive interface and may involve modality switching (between
visual and auditory), intelligent interruption, task negotiation and scheduling, and assisted context retrieval
via bookmarking (Schmorrow & Kruse, 2004). When a user condition is properly sensed, a suitable
strategy is chosen to ease the shortfall, the interface is modified to perform the strategy, and the resulting
sensory information confirms that the function has worked. Only then has a system closed the loop and
effectively augmented the user’s cognition.
Despite all the advances in technology, many constraints remain: equipment efficiency, cost, size, power
consumption, and pilot comfort, among others.

3

Proposed Augmented Cognition System

As technology advances in avionics, automation, and computing processes, cockpit systems become
increasingly complex. To overcome the limitations described above, we integrated an ACS into an
aircraft’s flight management system (FMS), which Figure 5 shows.
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Figure 5. Integration of Augmented Cognition into a Flight Management System

The integration of an ACS in the FMS will allow the ACS to access data collected from multiple systems
(e.g., GPS, VOR, weather radar, autopilot, aircraft health management systems, flight controls, etc.). The
ACS can cross-reference this data with data collected from other instruments and with the data saved in
the flight management database (aircraft limitations, performance, procedures, flight plan, etc.). All such
data are major elements in augmented cognition’s decision making and risk-assessment tools.
This process allows the ACS to precisely assess the aircraft’s state at each segment of the flight. By using
the ACS’s decision making and risk-assessment algorithm, the ACS prioritizes pilot tasks and provides
instruction via voice and display. Pilot and aircraft performance are measured against a set of standard
procedures and limitations (as specified by the FAA, airline, and aircraft manufacturer) as a nominal base.
Throughout the flight, from takeoff to landing, the ACS uses GPS, VOR, radar, and other navigational
guidance to collect additional information, and, by employing the decision making and risk-assessment
algorithm, locate the aircraft’s position. The ACS system cross-checks this with the flight plan, then
assesses the state of the aircraft and current segment of the flight (a basic GPS function). Using the
cross-referencing processes with information from other instruments—airspeed, ground speed, true
speed, altitude, weather conditions, wind, air pressure, thrust, aircraft health, ILS, and so on—and the
flight plan, the ACS identifies the next segment in the flight plan. Based on feedback from the decision
making and risk-assessment algorithm, the system can prioritize procedures and pilot tasks before
entering the new flight segment. Relevant procedures, such as those required for landing, and limitations,
such as altitude and airspeed, are then communicated to the flight crew by display and voice. The aircraft
can be controlled either manually or by autopilot.
The ACS also checks aircraft and pilot performance against the set of procedures and limitations. It
notifies the pilot of any system failure, emergency, or deviation from the aircraft’s limitations and
procedures by issuing an alarm and warnings by voice and display. For example, before entering the final
approach for runway 19L at Dulles International Airport, the ACS uploads the approach plate for the
selected runway from the database and briefs the pilot by voice and display. The system then provides
instructions to assist the pilot in reconfiguring the aircraft for the approach segment of the flight by using
the flight procedures designed by the manufacturer and airline. The ACS prioritizes these procedures and
announces relevant limitations (e.g., maximum and minimum airspeed for entering the approach) well in
advance of arrival at the entry point and triggers an alarm if the aircraft starts to diverge from the
procedures. In other words, the ACS creates a virtual tunnel in the flight path and assists the pilot in
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staying in this and other limitations by increasing the pilot’s situational awareness and attention allocation
and reducing the pilot’s workload through task prioritization. Due to space limitations for this paper, Figure
6 presents only a simplified ACS workflow for a flight’s descent and approach segment.

Figure 6. Simplified ACS Workflow

The pilot’s workload and opportunities for errors increase significantly during the approach and landing
segments of the flight. The pilot’s workload also significantly increases under instrument flight rules (IFR),
which govern a flight whenever flight by visual reference is not safe. Based on previous studies and data
from FAA and NTSB accident reports (National Transportation Safety Board, 2014), flying under IFR
conditions and during the last segment of the flight path (approach and landing) are the two conditions
under which the pilot’s workload increases the most. Because the opportunities for errors increase
correspondingly, most aviation accidents are attributed to human errors under these conditions. The pilot’s
workload becomes saturated as the pilot scans flight-deck instruments, sets flight controls and automation
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for approach and landing, communicates with the control tower, and follows a plethora of other
procedures. Therefore, chances for human errors increase as well. The proposed ACS assists the pilot by
constantly assessing the performance of both the pilot and the aircraft and providing feedback via the
closed-loop system. It prioritizes the pilot’s tasks in a timely manner and not only issues alarms and early
warnings, but also uses the decision making and risk-assessment algorithm to provide instructions for
optimal corrective actions. This method increases the pilot’s situational awareness and attention allocation
by combining augmented cognition with automation systems while simultaneously using other avionic
technology to manage and increase pilot performance and avoid human errors.

4

Problem Statement

Despite all the advancement in aviation technology and cockpit automation, aviation accidents still occur.
As the earlier sections indicate, human factors are still the major cause of aviation accidents. Cockpit
automation poses a risk of disengaging the pilot in the cockpit, introducing a great risk of increasing
human errors in aviation. Therefore, this study proposes integrating ACS in aircraft FMS and tests its
functionality and measures the pilot’s performance improvements.

4.1

Theory and Hypothesis

Scientists have established systematic models of memory, thinking, and cognition. The most recognized
model is the information processing model (IPM). This model has been framed around three key
components: sensory memory, working memory, and long-term memory (Halpern, 2003).
Humans can process a limited amount of incoming information in sensory and working memory, while
long-term memory is used for storing information and knowledge. In the sensory memory, sensory
information will be processed for a very short time, usually about half a second to 3 seconds. The sensory
information held in the sensory memory is very limited, usually about five to seven discrete elements such
as alphabetic letters. Therefore, if a person sees 10 letters simultaneously for 1 second, the person will
most likely remember only five to seven of those letters. The key function of sensory memory is to receive
and sort incoming stimuli and process those stimuli that are most applicable at that time (Schraw &
McCrudden, 2013).
Scientists have concluded that information processing in sensory memory typically happens too fast for
people to consciously control what they attend to. In other words, attention allocation and sensory
processing take place very quickly and may occur without conscious control.
There are two types of information that have higher chances of being processed in sensory memory: first,
relevant information to the task at hand and, second, information that is familiar and subject to automatic
processing. If relevant information is critical to a task, it may receive some degree of control or conscious
processing. However, a limited amount of such information can be processed at any given time in sensory
memory (Schraw & McCrudden, 2013).
There are two possible scenarios when stimuli enter sensory memory: they are either forwarded to
working memory or removed from the memory. Working memory refers to a temporary multi-component
memory in which meaning is assigned to it and it would be linked to other information pieces.
Automaticity is another important term in IPM. This term describes the ability to perform a task very fast
due to repeated practice (Stanovich, 2003). Such activities typically need less cognitive resources. An
example of such activities is monitoring cockpit instruments while the aircraft is flying on an auto-pilot
mode. Another key term is selective processing, which describes focusing one’s limited cognitive
resources deliberately on the most relevant stimuli to the task at hand.
The theory underlying the ACS is to assist pilots with recognizing incoming stimuli in the sensory memory
such that the ACS supplements the function of the sensory memory. In this process, the ACS works as an
external sensory memory that receives and sorts incoming stimuli and processes those stimuli that are
most applicable to the present time. The ACS provides instructions related to relevant information to the
task at hand and familiar information that is subject to selective and automatic processing. These
instructions will be forwarded to the working memory and, because they are subject to automaticity in
processing, such activities typically need less cognitive resources, consequently assisting pilots in terms
of task allocation, attentional resources, situational awareness, and workload management.
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Hence, integrating augmented cognition with automation systems in the aircraft cockpit reduces
human/pilot errors in aviation. Therefore, this study tests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Integrating augmented cognition with automation systems in the aircraft cockpit will
decrease human/pilot errors in aviation.

5

Experiment and Simulations

We used a within-subjects experimental design to assess the efficacy of the proposed ACS. All subjects
carried out an aviation task (to be described later) twice, once without ACS and once with ACS. They first
carried out the task without ACS, then with ACS, and we compared the results across both conditions. To
minimize learning effects, we designed the air traffic control clearances slightly differently and
incorporated a time gap between both flights.
Eighty-seven accidents involving scheduled Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 commuter and
on-demand flights in the US for which the probable cause is known were reported in the NTSB database
from January 2000 to December 2013 (National Transportation Safety Board, 2014). Also reported were
613 nonscheduled Part 135 accidents in the US for the same period for which the probable cause is
known.
Based on the information extracted from probable causes of these accidents, we can divide them into 10
categories for which the pilot (i.e., human factor) was the primary cause of the accident:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Pilot’s disorientation
Weather affecting pilot’s decisions and performance
Pilot’s failure to follow procedures
Pilot’s failure to maintain adequate airspeed
Pilot’s failure to extend the landing gear
Pilot’s failure to maintain appropriate rate of descent
Pilot’s failure to maintain appropriate direction
Pilot’s failure to maintain adequate distance/altitude from terrain
Pilot’s failure to maintain appropriate fuel management, and
Pilot’s failure to maintain a stabilized approach with adequate vertical and lateral tracks.

To test and validate the proposed aircraft ACS, we designed a flight scenario using FAA practical test
standards and used a flight simulator to introduce examples of the above accident-causing factors during
a simulated flight. Unpredicted errors by test pilots were identified and measured throughout the scenario,
and overall pilot performance and flight precision were measured to assess flight improvement.

5.1

Simulated Flight Scenario

A flight from Baltimore Washington International Airport (BWI) to Dulles International Airport (IAD) was
simulated under IFR conditions. The same scenario, which included a number of out-of-sequence events,
was repeated twice with each test pilot. The first flight was conducted using standard airplane flight
instruments—specifically, the Garmin G1000 Integrated Flight Management System. The second flight
was conducted using the Garmin G1000 integrated with the proposed ACS. In-flight emergency scenarios
were not described beforehand to test pilots. The test pilots were briefed on weather conditions, flight
plan, and all other standard procedures for aircraft.
Simulated weather conditions at BWI consisted of humidity 46 percent, wind speed 15 miles per hour from
230 degrees, barometer 30.40 inches (1029.4 mb), dewpoint at 34 degrees Fahrenheit (1°C), visibility at 7
miles, scattered clouds at 3500 feet Altitude above Ground Level (AGL), and winds aloft at 3000 feet from
280 degrees at 28 knots, 6000 feet from 290 degrees at 35 knots, 9000 feet from 290 degrees at 37
knots, and 12000 feet from 290 degrees at 41 knots.
Simulated weather conditions at IAD consisted of humidity 41 percent, wind speed 18 mph at 210
degrees, barometer 30.40 inches (1029.4 mb), dewpoint at 38 Fahrenheit (4°C), visibility at 5 miles,
scattered clouds 2500 feet AGL, and winds aloft at 3000 feet from 230 degrees at 25 knots, 6000 feet
from 240 degrees at 31 knots, 9000 feet from 240 degrees at 35 knots, and 12000 feet from 240 degrees
at 37 knots.
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During the flight, test pilots were required to communicate with air traffic controllers, navigate, and control
the flight safely to the destination. After departing BWI, a crosswind of 35 kn to 45 kn was introduced with
icing conditions at 4000 feet and above. As stated earlier, all flights were under IFR conditions. As the
pilot climbed to 4000 feet, the simulator introduced a pitot/static system failure due to icing, which affects
the airspeed indicator and the altimeter indicator. As a result of the low speed, the stall-warning system
was activated. The pilot’s performance and response to the failures and warning were measured under
both scenarios, and the precision of the flight was measured by the flight simulator.
Throughout the flight the simulator measured airspeed, true airspeed, vertical speed (rate of
climb/descent), horizontal position, and overall flight precision. Later in the flight, turbulence was
introduced to increase the pilot’s workload. The pilot was cleared to land at IAD using the standard GPS
approach, at which time the low-fuel warning came on. As the pilot entered the approach and landing
segment of the flight, the accuracy of the procedures and flight path were monitored.
In the second scenario, after activating the flight plan, the ACS performed the following functions to assist
the pilot:
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.2

Prioritized the pilot’s tasks
Provided instructions and procedures prior to each active task
Provided warnings, alarms, and corrective actions in case of any nonconformity with airplane
limitations or navigation or deviation from the flight plan, and
Monitored the flight and provided feedback to the pilot.

Study Sample

The study sample included 15 commercial (CML) and flight instructor (CFI, CFII, MEI, CFIG, and ATP)
certificate holders with instrument ratings and high performance ratings. The minimum flight time
requirement for this study was 500 hours (qualification requirement for regional airlines).

5.3

FAA Practical Test Standard Concept

Title 14 Part 61 of the CFR specifies the knowledge and skills an applicant must demonstrate to qualify for
an instrument rating. The CFR permits the FAA to publish practical test standards (PTS) that cover the
areas of operation and specific tasks in which pilot competency must be demonstrated (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2012). Adherence to the provisions of the regulations and PTS is mandatory for evaluating
instrument-rating applicants.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed augmented cognition system, we used FAA PTS standards
to measure the precision of flight maneuvers.

5.4

Use of the Practical Test Standards

The flight scenario included all the areas of operation and tasks required by the FAA for the airplane
commercial instrument rating and allowed for evaluation of as many required areas of operation and tasks
as possible without disruption. During the mission, the study interjected problems and emergencies that
the test pilot was required to manage so that most of the areas of operation and tasks could be
accomplished during the mission. It also afforded the flexibility to change the scenario to accommodate
unexpected situations as they arose.

6

Validation and Data Analysis

The study collected four types of data: (A) pilot demographics and qualifications, (B) survey responses,
(C) flight precision with no augmentation, and (D) flight precision with augmentation.
We used a paired t-test to compare two population means where we had two samples in which
observations in simulation without ACS can be paired with observations in the simulation with ACS to find
out if the integration of the ACS lead to improvements in the pilot’s use of the checklist, situational
awareness, and flight precision. We used the results from this paired t-test to draw conclusions about the
impact of this ACS module in general. Therefore, to analyze the main hypothesis, “Integrating augmented
cognition with automation systems in the aircraft cockpit will decrease human/pilot errors in aviation”, we
divided the main hypothesis into four sub-hypotheses:
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H1:

Integrating augmented cognition with automation systems in the aircraft cockpit will decrease
pilots’ errors in airspeed controls.

H2:

Integrating augmented cognition with automation systems in the aircraft cockpit will decrease
pilots’ errors in heading/directional controls.

H3:

Integrating augmented cognition with automation systems in the aircraft cockpit will decrease
pilots’ errors in altitude controls.

H4:

Integrating augmented cognition with automation systems in the aircraft cockpit will decrease
pilots’ errors in course/radial/bearing controls.

Let X = observations without ACS, Y = observation with ACS. To test the hypothesis this study used the
following procedure:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

6.1

Calculate the difference (𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) between the two observations on each pair.

Calculate the mean difference, 𝑑𝑑.
Calculate the standard deviation of the differences, 𝑆𝑆𝑑𝑑 , and use this to calculate the standard
𝑆𝑆
error of the mean difference, SE(𝑑𝑑) = 𝑑𝑑 ., when n = number of observations.
√𝑛𝑛

Calculate the t-statistic, which is given by𝑇𝑇 =

𝑑𝑑

. Under the hypothesis, this statistic follows

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑑𝑑)

a t-distribution with n − 1 degrees of freedom.
Use tables of the t-distribution to compare the value for T to the 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛−1 distribution. This presents
the p-value for the paired t-test.

Pilot Demographics

We extracted the following data from test pilots’ records: sex, age, hours of flight time, pilot certifications,
and number of flights in the last 90 days. All of them were male. Figure 7 shows the distribution of test
pilot ages. Figure 8 shows their hours of flight time. Figure 9 shows the pilot certifications, and Figure 10
presents the number of flights they had piloted in the last 90 days.

Figure 7. Pilot’s Age
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Figure 8. Total Pilot in Command (PIC) Hours

Figure 9. Pilot Certifications

Figure 10. Number of Flights in Last 90 Days

6.2

Survey Responses

As Figure 11 shows, in response to the question “Overall, how would you rate your level of intellectual
challenge with this augmented cognition system?”, the majority of test pilots indicated that they were not
intellectually challenged by the augmented cognition system.
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Figure 11. Level of Intellectual Challenge

As Figure 12 shows, in response to the question “Did the use of augmented cognition system in the
second flight increase your situational awareness?”, the overwhelming majority of pilots (87 percent)
indicated that the ACS in the second flight increased their situational awareness to a great extent. The
rest of the pilots (13%) indicated that the ACS increased their situational awareness to a considerable
extent.

Figure 12. Situational Awareness

As Figure 13 shows, in response to the question “Was the augmented cognition system’s instructions
organized in a manner that helped to reduce your workload in the cockpit?”, 46 percent of test pilots
indicated that the ACS instructions were organized in a manner that reduced their workload to a great
extent, followed by 46 percent to a considerable extent, and 8 percent to a moderate extent.
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Figure 13. Flight Workload

As Figure 14 shows, 40 percent of pilots indicated that the ACS instructions were organized in a manner
that helped to prioritize their tasks in the cockpit to a great extent, followed by 53 percent to a
considerable extent, and 7 percent to a limited extent.

Figure 14. Work Prioritization

As Figure 15 shows, regarding cockpit checklist and flight procedures, 87 percent of the pilots responded
that the ACS instructions were organized in a manner that helped them to use cockpit checklists and
follow flight procedures to a great extent and 13 percent to a considerable extent.

Figure 15. Use of Flight Checklist & Procedures

All of the pilots were strongly in favor of integrating the proposed ACS into cockpits. As previously shown,
they reported that the proposed ACS had significantly increased their situational awareness and helped
them to fully comply with cockpit checklists and procedures. As Figure 16 shows, all of them
recommended integrating the ACS in future cockpit design to a great extent.
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Figure 16. Integration of ACS in Future Cockpit Design

6.3

Flight Precision with and without Augmentation

We collected data on flight precision from the simulator, which measured use of cockpit checklists,
adherence to procedures, and flight precision. In the first flight, the simulation used standard instruments
with no ACS, and, in the second flight, the ACS was added to the standard instruments. Flights were
divided into four segments: departure, en-route, approach, and arrival. Flight precision during each
segment was measured in accordance with Title 14 of the CFR, Part 61, along four axes: (1) altitude, (2)
course, (3) radial/bearing, and heading, and (4) airspeed.
In the first simulation (without ACS), 92 percent of the pilots used cockpit checklists and adhered to
procedures to only a moderate extent, and 8 percent to a considerable extent. In the second simulated
flight (with ACS), 92 percent used cockpit checklists and adhered to procedures to a great extent and 8
percent to a considerable extent—a significant improvement (see Figure 17).

Figure 17. Use of Cockpit Checklists

In the first simulated flight (without ACS), flight-precision measurements showed that pilots complied with
procedures and clearances in the standard tolerances as follows: 53 percent maintained the applicable
airspeed within ± 15 knots, 33 percent within ± 20 knots, 7 percent within ± 10 knots, and 7 percent within
± 5 knots. In the second simulated flight (with ACS), 87 percent maintained the applicable airspeed within
± 5 knots, and 13 percent within ± 10 knots (see Figure 18). This is also a considerable improvement.
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Figure 18. Airspeed

As Table 1 shows, the calculated mean for airspeed error from the designated airspeed observed from the
simulator with ACS has dropped to 6.08 knots from 16.25 knots, which is the average mean of airspeed
error without the ACS. This indicates a 2.67 times improvement, which is supported by a large t-value of
21.41. Hence, the first sub-hypothesis (H1) was supported (p<0.01), suggesting that integrating
augmented cognition with automation systems in the aircraft cockpit decreases pilot errors in airspeed
controls.
Table 1. Airspeed Error t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Without ACS

With ACS

Mean error

16.25

6.08

Variance

10.70

4.31
60.00

Observations

60.00

Pearson correlation

0.11

Hypothesized mean difference

0.00

df

59.00

t stat

21.41

P(T<=t) one-tail

0.00

t critical one-tail

1.67

During the first simulated flight (without ACS), 53 percent of pilots maintained the applicable headings
within ± 15 degrees and 47 percent within ± 10 degrees. In contrast, 93 percent maintained the applicable
headings within ± 5 degrees during the second flight (with ACS), and only 7 percent within ± 10 degrees
(see Figure 19).
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Figure 19. Headings

Table 2 shows that the calculated average mean of the heading error from assigned heading collected by
simulator with ACS dropped to 5.75 degrees from 13.75 degrees, which is the average mean of heading
error without the ACS. This indicates a 2.39 times improvement, which is supported by a large t-value of
23.51. Hence, the second sub-hypothesis (H2) was supported (p<0.01), suggesting that integrating
augmented cognition with automation systems in the aircraft cockpit decreases pilot errors in
heading/directional controls.
Table 2. Heading Error t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Without ACS

With ACS

Mean error

13.75

5.75

Variance

7.31

3.24
60.00

Observations

60.00

Pearson correlation

0.37

Hypothesized mean difference

0.00

Df

59.00

t stat

23.51

P(T<=t) one-tail

0.00

t critical one-tail

1.67

Sixty percent of the test pilots maintained the applicable altitude within ± 100 feet and 40 percent within ±
150 feet in the first flight (without ACS). In the second flight (with ACS), 87 percent maintained the
applicable altitude within ± 50 feet and 13 percent within ± 100 feet (see Figure 20).
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Figure 20. Altitude

Table 3 shows that the calculated average mean of the altitude error from the designated altitude
collected by simulator with ACS has dropped to 58.33 feet from 137.50 feet, which is the average mean of
altitude error without the ACS. This indicates a 2.35 times improvement, which is supported by a large tvalue of 16.5. Hence, the third sub-hypothesis (H3) was supported (p<0.01), suggesting that integrating
augmented cognition with automation systems in the aircraft cockpit decreases pilot errors in altitude
controls.
Table 3. Altitude Error t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
Without ACS

With ACS

Mean error

137.50

58.33

Variance

1239.41

353.11
60.00

Observations

60.00

Pearson correlation

0.16

Hypothesized mean difference

0.00

Df

59.00

t stat

16.50

P(T<=t) one-tail

0.00

t critical one-tail

1.67

In the first simulated flight, with no ACS, 80 percent of test pilots
course/radial/bearing within ± ½ scale deflection of the CDI, and 20 percent
the CDI. After integration of ACS in the second flight, 80 percent
course/radial/bearing within ± ¼ scale deflection of the CDI, and 20 percent
the CDI—a 100 percent improvement (see Figure 21).
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Figure 21. Course, Radial, or Bearing

As Table 4 shows, the calculated average mean of the course/radial/bearing error from the assigned
course/radial/bearing error collected by simulator with ACS has dropped to 0.39 CDI from 0.65 CDI, which
is the average mean of courses/radials/bearings without the ACS. This indicates a 1.66 times
improvement which is supported by a large t-value of 16.21. Hence, the fourth sub-hypothesis (H4) was
supported (p<0.01), suggesting that integrating augmented cognition with automation systems in the
aircraft cockpit decreases pilot errors in course/radial/bearing controls.
Table 4. Course, Radial, or Bearing Error t-Test: Paired Two Simple for Means
Without ACS

With ACS

Mean error

0.65

0.39

Variance

0.02

0.02
60.00

Observations

60.00

Pearson correlation

0.58

Hypothesized mean difference

0.00

Df

59.00

t stat

16.1

P(T<=t) one-tail

0.00

t critical one-tail

1.67

Figure 22 shows an example of the vertical and horizontal profiles of one of the simulated flights with
standard instruments and no augmentation. The red line in the top left section of the figure shows the
lateral path taken by the aircraft from BWI airport to IAD airport. The waves on the red line indicate
deviation from the coordinated path provided by ATC. The bottom section of the figure shows vertical
positions of the aircraft throughout the flight. The steps on the line correspond to the descent and the
waves show the deviation from the assigned altitude by the ATC.
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Figure 22. Flight Precision from Simulator without ACS

Figure 23 shows an example of the vertical and horizontal profile of one of the simulated flights with
standard instruments and integrated ACS. As this figure illustrates, the flight with the ACS is more precise
and the lines are smoother and there are fewer waves (i.e., or deviation from ATC instructions).

Figure 23. Flight Precision from Simulator with Proposed ACS

7

Conclusion

Flight automation’s main benefit is that it relieves pilots from having to focus on ordinary flight tasks, which
then frees them to concentrate on overall flight performance, prepare for upcoming tasks, and respond to
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unexpected events. However, as human factors studies have demonstrated, pilots frequently lose their
situational awareness due to loss of concentration while using automation systems (Casner & Schooler,
2014; Wise, Garland, & Hopkin, 2009). As Casner and Schooler (2014) indicate:
This leaves pilots to watch over the automation as it does its work, but people can only
concentrate on something uneventful for so long. Humans aren’t robots. We can’t stare at a
green light for hours at a stretch without getting tired, bored, or going crazy.
The results of this study demonstrate that integrating an ACS into the cockpit not only enhances the pilot’s
ability to fly the airplane more precisely, but also increases the pilot’s situational awareness by improving
the human-machine interface through the human-in-the-loop concept. The ACS presented in this study
creates a closed-loop system by continuously monitoring and interacting with flight systems and the pilot.
By providing instructions to the pilot rather than simply automatically correcting errors and performing
relevant tasks, the ACS keeps the pilot engaged at all times during the flight and increases situational
awareness. In addition, the ACS reduces the pilot’s workload. By systematically using the system’s riskmanagement and decision making tools to identify the optimal corrective action or upcoming pilot tasks,
the ACS prioritizes tasks and presents them to the pilot step by step.
During the simulation without ACS, 92 percent of pilots used inflight checklists and procedures only to a
moderate extent. When ACS was added, 92 percent of pilots reported using them to a great extent—a
significant improvement, particularly in a context in which human errors can have serious consequences.
Data also show that the ACS used in the study allowed pilots to fly the airplane more precisely, with or
without autopilot.
With technological advances in avionics, automation, and computing processes, there is a trend towards
disengaging humans from their work. This poses the challenge of rethinking the interaction between
humans and machines to create an environment that combines the best features of both to keep humans
engaged in their work. In this research, we propose the use of ACS to keep pilots engaged.
Additionally the costs associated with integration of ACS with the aircraft FMS system can be assessed in
future studies. For airlines, this will include both the cost of the aircraft and the cost of integrating ACS
electronically with FMS in the cockpit. This integration can be done during the normal maintenance to
reduce the integration cost. Our research demonstrates that significant benefits can be realized with
integrating ACS.
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